Ideas from 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' by Hilary Putnam [1978], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' by Putnam,Hilary [RKP 1981,0-7100-0437-0]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

---

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

6267	A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science'

6272	'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth

6276	'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth

6266	We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique

6277	Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth

6264	In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language

6265	Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept

6269	Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

6280	Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic

6284	If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true?

13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony

6273	Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough

6274	Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion

14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic

17084

You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning

6282	Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions

6281	Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation

6278	We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

6271	How reference is specified is not what reference is

19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description

6268	The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions

19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language

6279	A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation

6270	The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour

6283	Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways)

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity

6275	You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs